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Andreas Fjellstad
Logical Nihilism and the Logic of ‘prem’
Abstract. As the final component of a chain of reasoning intended to take
us all the way to logical nihilism, Russell (2018) presents the atomic sen-
tence ‘prem’ which is supposed to be true when featuring as premise in
an argument and false when featuring as conclusion in an argument. Such
a sentence requires a non-reflexive logic and an endnote by Russell (2018)
could easily leave the reader with the impression that going non-reflexive
suffices for logical nihilism. This paper shows how one can obtain non-
reflexive logics in which ‘prem’ behaves as stipulated by Russell (2018) but
which nonetheless has valid inferences supporting uniform substitution of
any formula for propositional variables such as modus tollens and modus
ponens.
Keywords: logical nihilism; non-reflexive logic; non-transitive logic; dual
valuations; modus ponens
1. Introduction
Logical nihilism is the thesis that there are no logical laws. Following
Russell (2018), we can understand logical nihilism as the claim that there
are no valid inferential schemas. In a language with propositional vari-
ables, this claim corresponds to the claim that there is no valid inference
such that any formula can be uniformly substituted for propositional
variables that are possibly occurring in the inference. While some read-
ers may prefer a Fregean notion of a logical law and thus consider only
sentential schemas such as ϕ → ϕ as candidates for logical laws (where →
is a conditional connective of the language under consideration), we shall
here, following Russell (2018), also consider inferential schemas such as
ϕ → ψ, ϕ  ψ as candidates for logical laws, where  is an expression of
the metalanguage representing “entails”.
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A non-reflexive logic is a logic in which not every formula entails
itself, i.e. for which the inferential schema ϕ  ϕ does not hold. This
inferential schema is referred to by Russell (2018) as the law of identity.
While this is perhaps not the immediate candidate for a logical law to
question when things get tough, there is some recent research on the
use of a non-reflexive logic to accommodate self-referential definitions in
order to block the set-theoretic and truth-theoretic paradoxes. Examples
include (Gilmore, 1986), (Greenough, 2001), (Schroeder-Heister, 2016),
(French, 2016), (Fjellstad, 2017), (Nicolai and Rossi, 2018) and (Murzi
and Rossi, 2017). The non-reflexive logics presented in the literature
to that purpose share the feature that they do not have any valid infer-
ences that support uniform substitution of any formulas for propositional
variables. In effect, then, adopting such a logic would amount to em-
bracing logical nihilism in the above sense. Some might even see it as
an argument against that approach to blocking the set-theoretic and the
truth-theoretic paradoxes.
That a non-reflexive logic represents logical nihilism is also an idea
that shows up the discussions of (Russell, 2018) and (Dicher, 2020). As
an illustration of a strategy for creating counterexamples to any logical
law whatsoever, Russell (2018) presents a sentence labelled prem with
the following characteristics:
[L]et ‘prem’ be an atomic sentence whose value is true when it features
in the premises of an argument and false when it features in the con-
clusion (or in any other linguistic context). (Russell, 2018, p. 316)
prem is intended as a counterexample to the law of identity, that every
formula entails itself. If validity is (necessary) truth-preservation from
the premises to the conclusion, then surely a formula which is true when
evaluated as premise but false when evaluated as conclusion suffices as a
counterexample to the law of identity. In an endnote directly attached
the presentation of prem, (Russell, 2018) can be interpreted as asking
whether prem takes us all the way to logical nihilism:
[Does] this really get us all the way to nihilism? Strictly speaking, that
depends on what logical constants are in the language. In particular, if
you have ⊤ as a 0-place truthfunctor that is always interpreted as true,
then you will have some arguments with ⊤ and things like ⊤ ∨ ⊤ as a
conclusion. These will be valid regardless of the interpretation, so with
these logical constants you wonèt get all the way to nihilism. I donèt
highlight that very much here because it seems to me that a logic with
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only these laws may as well be logical nihilism, in that everything that
seems bad about the one seems bad about the other.
(Russell, 2018, n15)
Understood as a remark concerning prem, Russell’s (2018) point seems
to be that we can certainly add truth-constants to a non-reflexive logic
in order to obtain valid inferences that support uniform substitution,
but that such inferences are not particularly useful. Indeed, the endnote
concludes with that such inferences are not “useful for doing metathe-
ory. Or assessing proofs in arithmetic.” After all, the inferences do not
have any place-holders for the propositions which we are interested in
reasoning about.
The aim of this paper is to show that a non-reflexive logic does not
represent the straightforward path to logical nihilism suggested by Rus-
sell’s (2018) endnote despite the fact that the non-reflexive logics ex-
plored in the literature on set-theoretic and truth-theoretic paradoxes
are de facto instances of logical nihilism.
The strategy will be as follows. While this paper agrees with (Russell,
2018) that it will depend on what logical constants there is in the lan-
guage, there is no reason to limit our attention to ⊤ and ⊥. Instead, we
can easily tweak the interpretation of familiar logical constants such as ¬
and → to thereby obtain non-reflexive logics for prem with what we can
describe as useful valid inferences that support the uniform substitution
of any formula for propositional variables. In particular, the paper will
proceed as follows. After elaborating on some further aspects with logical
nihilism in section 2, the paper presents in section 3 the semantics for
tonk proposed by Fjellstad (2015) as adapted to prem. It then shows
first in section 4 how to tweak the interpretation of negation to obtain
a non-reflexive logic for prem in which modus tollens holds, and then
in section 5 how to tweak the interpretation of the conditional to obtain
a non-reflexive logic for prem in which modus ponens holds. Finally,
the paper observes that the simple strategy to obtain a logic for prem
in which modus ponens holds is not transferable to a non-reflexive logic
with transparent truth without significant sacrifices.
This paper should thus not be be read as attempting to block Rus-
sell’s (2018) path to nihilism which consists in questioning logical laws
through the introduction of constants to capture various semantic or log-
ical phenomena. Instead, it should be read as a defence of non-reflexive
logics which consists in showing that they do not require us to give up
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the idea of there being valid inferences supporting uniform substitution
of any formula for propositional variables which are useful for reasoning
about our favourite propositions. Failure of the law of identity is not a
shortcut to logical nihilism.
2. Simple logical nihilism
A logic L based on a language L can be explicated as collection of pairs
〈Γ,A〉 where A is a formula of L and Γ is a set of formulas of L. Based on
Cook’s (2012) analysis of a logical truth, it seems fair to say that a logic L
defined for a language L which includes propositional variables is empty
if and only if for every 〈Γ,A〉 ∈ L there is an inference 〈Γ (B/p), A(B/p)〉
obtained by uniformly substituting a formula B for a propositional vari-
able p in every formula of Γ and in A such that 〈Γ (B/p), A(B/p)〉 6∈ L.
With logical nihilism as the view according to which there are no valid
inferential schemas, a logic can be said to represent logical nihilism just
in case it is empty. As far as Russell’s (2018) endnote goes, however it is
not sufficient for a logic to be non-empty. Instead, Russell (2018) seems
to require more. For example, the inference in question cannot be valid
solely in virtue of constants such as ⊤ and ⊥. Assume for example that
〈{⊥},⊤〉 ∈ L. It certainly satisfies uniform substitution because there
are no propositional variables to replace. On the other hand, it is quite
useless as an inference precisely because there is no place-holder for the
propositions we would like to reason about. Consider in the same vein
the inference 〈{⊥}, p ∧ ¬p〉. While this inference allows us to replace
the propositional variable with our favourite propositions, there is still a
sense in which this inference does us no good with respect to reasoning
about our favourite propositions. To avoid logical nihilism then, a logic
should not only be not empty, but also satisfy inferential schemas that
are useful for reasoning in the way intended by Russell (2018, n15), i.e.
“useful for doing metatheory [o]r assessing proofs in arithmetic.” No
matter how this notion of usefulness should be made more precise, I
think it is fair to treat modus ponens and modus tollens as paradigmatic
examples thereof.
To rescue non-reflexive logics from logical nihilism then, we need
a non-reflexive logic in which prem behaves as stipulated by Russell
(2018), but which nonetheless contains an inference containing proposi-
tional variables for which uniform substitution holds and which is useful
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in the above sense. With modus ponens and modus tollens being the
paradigmatic examples, we shall concentrate on them.
3. From tonk to prem
In the concluding remarks, Russell (2018) notes that the counterexample
to the law of identity makes
one curious about regularities in truth-preservation over sentences
whose truth-value can change in the course of an argument  an under-
explored topic, and perhaps one that has been under-explored because
of the fear of logical nihilism. (Russell, 2018, p. 321)
Luckily for our purposes, the proposal that the truth-value of a sentence
could change in the course of an argument is not completely unexplored
in the contemporary literature. Without any fear of logical nihilism,
Fjellstad (2015) presents a semantics for Prior’s connective tonk which
delivers a non-reflexive and non-transitive logic based on precisely that
idea through the definition of two bivalent valuation functions Vp and
Vc with a definition of A-tonk-B such that A-tonk-B can be true on
Vp but false on Vc (and vice versa). Entailment is now defined as truth-
preservation from Vp to Vc. In particular, the following clauses are used
for tonk, ¬ and → by Fjellstad (2015):1
• Vp(A → B) = 1 iff Vc(A) = 0 or Vp(B) = 1
• Vc(A → B) = 1 iff Vp(A) = 0 or Vc(B) = 1
• Vp(¬A) = 1 iff Vc(A) = 0
• Vc(¬A) = 1 iff Vp(A) = 0
• Vp(A-tonk-B) = 1 iff Vp(B) = 1
• Vc(A-tonk-B) = 1 iff Vc(A) = 1
In addition, it is required that for every propositional variable P , Vp(P )
= Vc(P ). Let a pair 〈Vp, Vc〉 satisfying these conditions be a dual valua-
tion for tonk. Entailment is now defined as follows:
1 We thus take the set of formulas to consist of those obtained using those con-
nectives from a set of propositional variables. While we will replace tonk with prem
and later on also add conc, we shall keep the rest of the language fixed and thus not
consider other standard connectives then a negation and a conditional. Our focus on
these two connectives is justified through the fact that they are the ones that occur
in modus ponens and modus tollens.
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Γ 1 B if and only if for every dual valuation for tonk 〈Vp, Vc〉,
if for every A ∈ Γ, Vp(A) = 1 then for Vc(B) = 1.
It is natural to look at this framework in the search of models for prem
with an initial proposal being to simply replace the clauses for tonk
with the requirement that every valuation is such that Vp(prem) = 1 and
Vc(prem) = 0. We shall moreover drop the restriction on propositional
variables since it induces failure of uniform substitution; the result of
substituting prem for p in for example the valid inference 〈{p}, p〉 is not
valid. Let this be a preliminary dual valuation for prem.
As it turns out, ¬ and → in preliminary dual valuations for prem are
isomorphic to preliminary tetravaluations for prem defined as functions
V from the formulas to the set {t, p, c, f} such that V (prem) = p and in
which ¬ and → satisfy the following tables:
A → B t p c f
t t p c f
p t p t p
c t t c c






These tables are easily recognised as the material conditional and nega-
tion for FDE as presented by Belnap (1977) and Omori and Wansing
(2017). For entailment, however, we replace the above definiens with
the following for tetravalent valuations:
every preliminary tetravalent valuation for prem V is such that
if for every A ∈ Γ, V (A) ∈ {t, p} then V (B) ∈ {t, c}.
The proof that they are equivalent is trivial considering the fact that we
can treat the dual valuations as tetravaluations along the following lines:
• Vp(A) = 1 and Vc(A) = 1 iff V (A) = t
• Vp(A) = 1 and Vc(A) = 0 iff V (A) = p
• Vp(A) = 0 and Vc(A) = 1 iff V (A) = c
• Vp(A) = 0 and Vc(A) = 0 iff V (A) = f
The reader will thus be spared the tedious details.
While this framework is certainly a good starting point since it per-
mits a change in context from premise to conclusion, it will deliver us
logical nihilism in the sense discussed by Russell (2018). This is as ex-
pected since the trivalent valuations obtained by dropping c, the result
of which are valuations known as strong Kleene, is the typical tool for
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obtaining theories of transparent truth and naive validity based on a
non-reflexive logic, see for example (Fjellstad, 2017), but also (French,
2016), (Nicolai and Rossi, 2018) and (Murzi and Rossi, 2017). After all,
one virtue with that approach is that one can use standard rules from a
bilateral sequent calculus for classical logic to define → and ¬. This is
also more or less the framework considered for prem by Dicher (2020),
thus following the lead of Russell (2018) who employs FDE for other
purposes in the section where prem is introduced. Let’s do better.
4. A negational twist
In the preliminary dual valuations for prem the truth or falsity of ¬prem
when featuring as conclusion depends on the truth or falsity of prem as
premise. However, why shouldn’t it rather be the case that the truth or
falsity of ¬prem when featuring as conclusion depends on the truth or
falsity of prem as conclusion? After all, we can certainly also make sense
of the proposal that ¬prem is always true as conclusion since prem is
always false as conclusion.2
Since the discussion by Russell (2018) does not provide any direct
guidance on the issue of negation with regard to prem, we might as well
adopt the following clauses for ¬ with regard to dual valuations:
• Vp(¬A) = 1 iff Vp(A) = 0
• Vc(¬A) = 1 iff Vc(A) = 0
These clauses articulate the idea that formulas of the form ¬A are eval-
uated with regard to the same context, i.e. that the value of ¬A as
premise depends on the value of A as premise as opposed to value of A







Let us call the resulting collections of valuations in which ¬ is defined
as proposed in this section and → is defined as in the previous section
2 As suggested to me by Bogdan Dicher.
3 This table actually corresponds to that recently used by Button (2016) and
originally proposed by Church (1944).
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negational dual valuations for prem and negational tetravaluations for
prem respectively.
With the help of the new valuations we can now define Γ 2 B as
either
• for every negational tetravaluation for prem V , if for any A ∈ Γ ,
V (A) ∈ {t, p} then V (B) ∈ {t, c}
or
• for every negational dual valuation for prem 〈Vp, Vc〉, if for any A ∈ Γ ,
Vp(A) = 1 then Vc(B) = 1.
as definiens.
To make reasoning about what is valid in this logic easier it is useful
to have a sound and complete sequent calculus. In order to obtain rules
that allow for the kind of straightforward compositional construction of
complex formulas that we are used to in the case of a standard bilat-
eral sequent calculus for classical logic such as that presented by Negri
and von Plato (2001), we shall here rely on quadrilateral as opposed
to bilateral sequents, i.e. we shall use sequents with four as opposed to
two positions for formulas. A bilateral sequent written for example as
Γ ⇒ ∆ typically represents a pair 〈Γ,∆〉 of (possibly empty) multisets
of formulas, where the first element of the pair is represented by the first
position (i.e. the position left of ⇒), and the second element of the pair
is represented by the second position (i.e. the position right of ⇒). Our
quadrilateral sequents of the form
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
on the other hand, shall be taken to represent a quadruple of (possibly
empty) multisets of formulas 〈Γ, Γ ′, ∆,∆′〉. The result is slightly more
complex sequents (since four is greater than two), but in the trade-off we
obtain very straightforward compositional rules that facilitate root-first
proof search.
The intended interpretation for quadrilateral sequents of the form
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′ is that such a sequent is valid just in case there is no
negational tetravaluation such that
for every formula A ∈ Γ , V (A) ∈ {c, f}, for every formula A ∈ Γ ′,
V (A) ∈ {t, p}, for every formula A ∈ ∆, V (A) ∈ {p, f} and for
every formula A ∈ ∆′, V (A) ∈ {t, c}.
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Equivalently, such a sequent is valid just in case there is no negational
dual valuation such that
for every formula A ∈ Γ , Vp(A) = 0, for every formula A ∈ Γ ′,
Vp(A) = 1, for every formula A ∈ ∆, Vc(A) = 0 and for every
formula A ∈ ∆′, Vc(A) = 1.
It follows from this interpretation of a quadrilateral sequent that, if the
sequent calculus is sound and complete, then
Γ 2 B if and only if the sequent | Γ ⇒ B | is derivable.
That is, the sequent calculus will be designed such that Γ implies A
just in case we can derive the sequent such that the left-most position is
empty and Γ is the position left of ⇒ and the multiset containing one
copy of B is the position right of ⇒ and the right-most position is empty.
From the perspective of the desired definition of validity, the left-most
and the right-most positions play a supporting role. As a consequence
of their addition and the above definition of the validity of a sequent, it
follows that there will in our case be valid sequents that do not represent
valid inferences of 2. Examples of such sequents include the following:
prem | prem ⇒ | prem | ⇒ | prem
Of course, a quick inspection of the sequents and the below rules will
reveal that sequents representing valid inferences can be derived from
these. Nevertheless, all this might seem odd for the reader who is used
to thinking that every object constructed with a proof in a deductive
system for a particular logic must represent a valid inference of that logic.
However, such a reader should keep in mind that this sequent calculus is
merely intended a mathematical tool to simplify reasoning about what
is valid in a particular logic. For some brief remarks on this author’s
philosophical perspective on sequent calculi; see (Fjellstad, 2020).
As usual for sequent calculi, the calculus will consist of initial(ly
derivable) sequents and rules with zero or more sequents as premises
and one sequent as conclusion. Both initial sequents and the rules are
presented in the usual schematic form. Derivations are trees where the
leafs are (instances of the presented) initial sequents and zero premise
rules and each non-leaf node is obtained from one or more nodes with a(n
instance of a presented) rule such that the root of each subtree is itself
a derivable sequent. The root of the tree is thus the sequent for which
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the tree is a derivation. For a general introduction to sequent calculus
as a proof-theoretic framework; see (Negri and von Plato, 2001).
Our calculus consists of initial sequents for propositional variables
and zero-premise rules for prem of the following form:
Γ, P | P, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′ Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆,P | P,∆′
prem, Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′ Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′, prem
And the following rules for ¬ and →:
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆,A | ∆′ Γ | B, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
Γ | A → B, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
Γ | A, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆,B | ∆′
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆,A → B | ∆′
A, Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′ Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′, B
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′, A → B
B, Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′, A
A → B, Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
A, Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
Γ | Γ ′,¬A ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
Γ | Γ ′, A ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
¬A, Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆,A | ∆′
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′,¬A
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′, A
Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ¬A,∆ | ∆′
The simplicity of the rules with regard to compositionality is due to the
use of quadrilateral as opposed to bilateral sequents. The reader sceptical
of this claim is free to attempt to develop an equally elegant sound and
complete bilateral sequent calculus for the same logic without treating
the negation of complex formulas as a defined rather than a primitive
symbol.
That the calculus is sound and complete should be obvious consid-
ering the proofs in for example (Fjellstad, 2015, 2017). From soundness
and completeness we can conclude that Γ 2 A if and only if | Γ ⇒ A |
is derivable.
Modus tollens is now derived as follows for two propositional variables
P1 and P2:
P1 | P1 ⇒ |
| P1,¬P1 ⇒ |
| ⇒ P2 | P2
| ⇒ ¬P2, P2 |
| ¬P1, P2 → P1 ⇒ ¬P2 |
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Moreover, it follows by induction on the complexity of a formula that
sequents of the following forms are derivable for every formula A:
Γ,A | A, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′ Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆,A | A,∆′
It follows that the sequent obtained by uniformly replacing every occur-
rence of either P1 or P2 with any formula A in the sequent | ¬P1, P2 →
P1 ⇒ ¬P2 | is derivable. Modus tollens holds thus for every formula.
It would therefore be rather intolerant to treat this logic as represent-
ing logical nihilism despite it being non-reflexive since prem 22 prem.
Of course, we have only delivered modus tollens, and is it straightforward
to find a countermodel to modus ponens: let Vp(P1) = 1, Vc(P1) = 0,
Vp(P2) = 0 and Vc(P2) = 0. It follows that Vp(P1 → P2) = 1. Similarly
with for example double negation elimination.
A perhaps more serious issue is that the clauses for negation ensure
that Vp(¬prem)=0 and Vc(¬prem)=1 which in turn means that 2 will
be non-transitive; it holds that A 2 ¬prem and ¬prem 2 B for arbi-
trary formulas A and B. Now, while Russell (2018) didn’t provide any
guidelines about negation, it would seem unreasonable that a sentence
which was only supposed to induce failure of reflexivity also, because of
the negational twist, induces a failure of transitivity. Instead, that role
seems to fall upon the overlooked cousin of prem, namely the constant
conc which is supposed to always be true as conclusion but false as
premise. With the negational twist, ¬prem behaves as conc. While
there is some conceptual prudence in that equivocation, it seems unfair
not only towards prem, but especially towards conc.
5. Reconsidering the conditional
With conc in the picture as a constant which is supposed to satisfy
the requirement that Vp(conc) = 0 and Vc(conc) = 1 in the case
of dual valuations and the requirement that V (conc) = c in the case
of tetravaluations, and under the assumption that the negation of one
shouldn’t be equivalent to the other, it seems better to leave negation as
it was and rather reconsider the conditional as a path towards valid infer-
ences supporting uniform substitution of any formula for a propositional
variable.
The literature on many-valued logics offer plenty of tetravalued con-
ditionals. In addition to the FDE conditional, we have for example
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Łukasiewicz’s (1970) conditional, Avron’s (1991) conditional and Sut-
cliffe, Pelletier and Hazen’s (2018) conditional. However, rather than
going through each of these to check their suitability, we can also simply
ask what we want from the conditional in the first place. For example,
if we want modus ponens to hold, then it must be the case that
(MPD) if Vp(A → B) = 1, then Vp(A) = 0 or Vc(B) = 1.
Since all we require is a single valid inference supporting uniform substi-
tution, and philosophers in general are quite fond of modus ponens, we
shall stick with this as requirement.
With regard to tetravaluations, the corresponding requirement is that
(MPT) if V (A → B) ∈ {t, p} and V (A) ∈ {t, p}, then V (B) ∈ {c, t}.
With this being equivalent to that if V (A) ∈ {t, p} and V (B) ∈ {p, f}
then V (A → B) ∈ {c, f}, it follows that any table of the form





will do the trick. Incidentally, it turns out that none of the conditionals
proposed by Łukasiewicz (1970), Avron (1991) and Sutcliffe, Pelletier
and Hazen (2018) satisfy this requirement. This shouldn’t surprise us
since they were not designed for the purpose of obtaining modus ponens
in a logic for which the law of identity fails. On the other hand, we
have plenty of alternatives just waiting to be generated from the above
template. All we need to do is to fill out the blanks in such a way that
it delivers other desirable properties of a conditional. There are certain
limitations to which properties one can obtain, of course, and the reader
is referred to (Égré et al., 2000) for some negative results.
From the perspective of the quadrilateral sequents presented in the
previous section, it suffices to note that the above requirement is also
equivalent to the following:
(*) if V (A → B) ∈ {t, p}, then V (B) ∈ {c, t} or V (A) ∈ {c, f}.
This in turn, means that any conditional satisfying our requirement will
be such that the following rule is admissible in a quadrilateral sequent
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calculus which is sound and complete under the interpretation suggested
in the previous section:
A, Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′ Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′, B
Γ | A → B, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′
With the admissibility of the sequents
A, Γ | A, Γ ′ ⇒ ∆ | ∆′ Γ | Γ ′ ⇒ ∆,B | ∆′, B
it is straightforward to derive modus ponens. On the other hand, with
V (prem) = p, V (conc) = c and entailment defined as in the previ-
ous sections, the logic is still non-reflexive because of prem and non-
transitive because of conc.
A perhaps important caveat with any conditional satisfying this re-
quirement is that the value p can no longer be used as a safe harbour
for the Curry sentence when truth is transparent in the sense that
V (Tr(t)) = V (A) whenever the closed term t functions as a name for
the formula A and Tr is the truth predicate. Assume that κ is a term
functioning as a name for the formula Tr(κ) → ⊥ where V (⊥) = f. The
condition on the conditional implies now that if V (Tr(κ) → ⊥) = p then
V (Tr(κ)) ∈ {c, f}.
Luckily, however, the aim of this paper is not to rescue non-reflexive
logics for transparent truth from logical nihilism. Instead, the aim was to
clarify whether Russell’s (2018) prem and non-reflexive logics in general
invite logical nihilism or not. To that end this paper has illustrated how
a logic for prem need not deliver logical nihilism in the sense of (Russell,
2018) since a logic for prem can certainly contain inferences with which
we can reason about our favourite propositions. It’s just a matter of
being a bit creative.
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